• Does AI need more economic thinking?
• The role of background knowledge in conversation
• The allure of verificationism
• The Duhem-Quine thesis
• The role of competing theories in combatting the thesis
• Are conspiracies the price we pay for independent thinking?

• Michael I. Jordan on ML Street Talk: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AREWYbVtX64
• Our conversation with Ben Recht: https://www.incrementspodcast.com/91

People involved in a fruitful critical discussion of a problem often rely, if only unconsciously, upon two things: the acceptance by all parties of the common aim of getting at the truth, or at least nearer to the truth, and a considerable amount of common background knowledge. This does not mean that either of these two things is an indispensable basis of every discussion, or that these two things are themselves ‘a priori’, and cannot be critically discussed in their turn. It only means that criticism never starts from nothing, even though every one of its starting points may be challenged, one at a time, in the course of the critical debate.
- C&R, Chap 10

While discussing a problem we always accept (if only temporarily) all kinds of things as unproblematic: they constitute for the time being, and for the discussion of this particular problem, what I call our background knowledge. Few parts of this background knowledge will appear to us in all contexts as absolutely unproblematic, and any particular part of it may be challenged at any time, especially if we suspect that its uncritical acceptance may be responsible for some of our difficulties. But almost all of the vast amount of background knowledge which we constantly use in any informal discussion will, for practical reasons, necessarily remain unquestioned; and the misguided attempt to question it all—that is to say, to start from scratch—can easily lead to the breakdown of a critical debate. (Were we to start the race where Adam started, I know of no reason why we should get any further than Adam did.)
- C&R, Chap 10

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In our fourth ep on Chapter 10 in C&R, we wrestle with Popper's treatment of verisimilutude, both the formal and informal versions. Did the project fail? Was Popper out of his mind? Does this invalidate everything?

• Murders with ball-peen hammers
• Walking the line between verification and falsification
• Is science only after truth?
• Verisimilutude and its formalization
• Why the formalization fails
• Popper's three requirements for the growth of knowledge
• Popper's ratchet and the no ad-hoc rule

Like many other philosophers I am at times inclined to classify philosophers as belonging to two main groups—those with whom I disagree, and those who agree with me.
- C&R, page 309

I shall give here a somewhat unsystematic list of six types of cases in which we should be inclined to say of a theory t1 that it is superseded by t2 in the sense that t2 seems—as far as we know—to correspond better to the facts than t1 , in some sense or other.

• t2 makes more precise assertions than t1 , and these more precise assertions stand up to more precise tests.
• t2 takes account of, and explains, more facts than t1 (which will include for example the above case that, other things being equal, t2 ’s assertions are more precise).
• t2 describes, or explains, the facts in more detail than t1 .
• t2 has passed tests which t 1 has failed to pass.
• t2 has suggested new experimental tests, not considered before t 2 was designed (and not suggested by t1 , and perhaps not even applicable to t1 ); and t 2 has passed these tests.
• t2 has unified or connected various hitherto unrelated problems.

- C&R, page 315

Let me first say that I do not suggest that the explicit introduction of the idea of verisimilitude will lead to any changes in the theory of method. On the contrary, I think that my theory of testability or corroboration by empirical tests is the proper methodological counterpart to this new metalogical idea. The only improvement is one of clarification.
- C&R, page 318

• Follow us on Twitter at @IncrementsPod, @BennyChugg, @VadenMasrani
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Check out more from Brett Hall here and Peter Boghossian here.

• What is the relationship between confidence and evidence?
• The "formal apparatus of science" vs the "sociology" of science
• Eddington's famous experiment
• Why confidence and belief can't be mathematized (But why they are useful nonetheless)
• Confidence as a function of falsifying experiments
• Bayesianism vs critical rationalism
  

• Paper discussing how it took the wider scientific community over 40 years (after Eddington's experiment!) to become convinced in the truth of general relativity: The 1919 measurement of the deflection of light
• Eddington's original paper:
• Vaden and Brett's blog exchange

• Follow us on Twitter at @IncrementsPod, @BennyChugg, @VadenMasrani
• Come join our discord server! DM us on twitter or send us an email to get a supersecret link
• Become a patreon subscriber here. Or give us one-time cash donations to help cover our lack of cash donations here.
• Click dem like buttons on youtube

Where were you last night, and why do you have condoms in your pocket? Tell us at incrementspodcast@gmail.com.

Support Increments