In our fourth ep on Chapter 10 in C&R, we wrestle with Popper's treatment of verisimilutude, both the formal and informal versions. Did the project fail? Was Popper out of his mind? Does this invalidate everything?

We discuss

• Murders with ball-peen hammers
• Walking the line between verification and falsification
• Is science only after truth?
• Verisimilutude and its formalization
• Why the formalization fails
• Popper's three requirements for the growth of knowledge
• Popper's ratchet and the no ad-hoc rule

Quotes

Like many other philosophers I am at times inclined to classify philosophers as belonging to two main groups—those with whom I disagree, and those who agree with me.
- C&R, page 309

I shall give here a somewhat unsystematic list of six types of cases in which we should be inclined to say of a theory t1 that it is superseded by t2 in the sense that t2 seems—as far as we know—to correspond better to the facts than t1 , in some sense or other.

• t2 makes more precise assertions than t1 , and these more precise assertions stand up to more precise tests.
• t2 takes account of, and explains, more facts than t1 (which will include for example the above case that, other things being equal, t2 ’s assertions are more precise).
• t2 describes, or explains, the facts in more detail than t1 .
• t2 has passed tests which t 1 has failed to pass.
• t2 has suggested new experimental tests, not considered before t 2 was designed (and not suggested by t1 , and perhaps not even applicable to t1 ); and t 2 has passed these tests.
• t2 has unified or connected various hitherto unrelated problems.

- C&R, page 315

Let me first say that I do not suggest that the explicit introduction of the idea of verisimilitude will lead to any changes in the theory of method. On the contrary, I think that my theory of testability or corroboration by empirical tests is the proper methodological counterpart to this new metalogical idea. The only improvement is one of clarification.
- C&R, page 318

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But eventually putting those disagreements aside, we return to the subject at hand: The Conjectures and Refutations Series: Chapter 10: Truth, Rationality, and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge (Part II). Here all goes smoothly. Just kidding, we start fighting about content again almost immediately. Where are the guests to break us up when you need them.

We discuss

• Why Vaden changed his mind about "all thought is problem solving"
• Something that rhymes with wero horship
• Is Popper sloppy when it comes to writing about probability and content
• Is all modern data science based on the wrong idea? (Hint: No)
• Popper's problem-focused view of scientific progress
• How much formalization is too much?
• The difference between high verisimilitude and high probability
• Why do we value simplicity in science?
• Historical examples of science progressing via theories with increasing content

Quotes

Consciousness, world 2, was presumably an evaluating and discerning consciousness, a problem-solving consciousness, right from the start. I have said of the animate part of the physical world 1 that all organisms are problem solvers. My basic assumption regarding world 2 is that this problem-solving activity of the animate part of world 1 resulted in the emergence of world 2, of the world of consciousness. But I do not mean by this that consciousness solves problems all the time, as I asserted of the organisms. On the contrary. The organisms are preoccupied with problem-solving day in, day out, but consciousness is not only concerned with the solving of problems, although that is its most important biological function. My hypothesis is that the original task of consciousness was to anticipate success and failure in problem-solving and to signal to the organism in the form of pleasure and pain whether it was on the right or wrong path to the solution of the problem.

• In Search of a Better World, p.17 (emphasis added)

The criterion of potential satisfactoriness is thus testability, or improbability: only a highly testable or improbable theory is worth testing, and is actually (and not merely potentially) satisfactory if it withstands severe tests—especially those tests to which we could point as crucial for the theory before they were ever undertaken.
- C&R, Chapter 10

Consequently there is little merit in formalizing and elaborating a deductive system (intended for use as an empirical science) beyond the requirements of the task of criticizing and testing it, and of comparing it critically with competitors.
- C&R, Chapter 10

Admittedly, our expectations, and thus our theories, may precede, historically, even our problems. Yet science starts only with problems. Problems crop up especially when we are disappointed in our expectations, or when our theories involve us in difficulties, in contradictions; and these may arise either within a theory, or between two different theories, or as the result of a clash between our theories and our observations.
- C&R, Chapter 10

Socials

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Is "Ben and Vaden will fight about content" high or low probability? Tell us at incrementspodcast@gmail.com

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Check out more from Brett Hall here and Peter Boghossian here.

We discuss

• What is the relationship between confidence and evidence?
• The "formal apparatus of science" vs the "sociology" of science
• Eddington's famous experiment
• Why confidence and belief can't be mathematized (But why they are useful nonetheless)
• Confidence as a function of falsifying experiments
• Bayesianism vs critical rationalism
  

References

• Paper discussing how it took the wider scientific community over 40 years (after Eddington's experiment!) to become convinced in the truth of general relativity: The 1919 measurement of the deflection of light
• Eddington's original paper:
• Vaden and Brett's blog exchange

Socials

• Follow us on Twitter at @IncrementsPod, @BennyChugg, @VadenMasrani
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Where were you last night, and why do you have condoms in your pocket? Tell us at incrementspodcast@gmail.com.

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Follow Liron on twitter (@liron) and check out the Doom Debates youtube channel and podcast.

We discuss

• Whether we're concerned about AI doom
• Bayesian reasoning versus Popperian reasoning
• Whether it makes sense to put numbers on all your beliefs
• Solomonoff induction
• Objective vs subjective Bayesianism
• Prediction markets and superforecasting

References

• Vaden's blog post on Cox's Theorem and Yudkowsky's claims of "Laws of Rationality": https://vmasrani.github.io/blog/2021/the_credence_assumption/
• Disproof of probabilistic induction (including Solomonov Induction): https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.00749
• EA Post Vaden Mentioned regarding predictions being uncalibrated more than 1yr out: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/hqkyaHLQhzuREcXSX/data-on-forecasting-accuracy-across-different-time-horizons#Calibrations
• Article by Gavin Leech and Misha Yagudin on the reliability of forecasters: https://ifp.org/can-policymakers-trust-forecasters/
• Superforecaster p(doom) is ~1%: https://80000hours.org/2024/09/why-experts-and-forecasters-disagree-about-ai-risk/#:~:text=Domain%20experts%20in%20AI%20estimated,by%202100%20(around%2090%25).
• The existential risk persuasion tournament https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/the-extinction-tournament
• Some more info in Ben's article on superforecasting: https://benchugg.com/writing/superforecasting/
• Slides on Content vs Probability: https://vmasrani.github.io/assets/pdf/popper_good.pdf

Socials

• Follow us on Twitter at @IncrementsPod, @BennyChugg, @VadenMasrani, @liron
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What's your credence that the second debate is as fun as the first? Tell us at incrementspodcast@gmail.com

Special Guest: Liron Shapira.

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Follow David on Twitter (@DavidDeutschOxf) or find his website here.

We discuss

• Whether belief is a fruitful lens through which to analyze ideas
• Whether a non-quantitative form of belief can be defended
• How does belief bottom out epistemologically?
• Whether statistics and probability are useful
• Where should statistics and probability be used in practice?
• The Popper-Miller theorem
• Statements vs propositions and their relevance for truth
• Whether Popper and Deutsch disagree about truth

References

• The Popper-Miller theorem. See the original paper
• David's 2021 talk on the correspondence theory of truth
• David's talk on physics without probability.
• Hempel's paradox
• The Beginning of Infinity
• Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem

Socials

• Follow us on Twitter at @IncrementsPod, @BennyChugg, @VadenMasrani, @DavidDeutschOxf
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What's the truth about your belief on the probability of useful statistics? Tell us over at incrementspodcast@gmail.com.

Special Guest: David Deutsch.

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From The Theory of Anything Podcast description: Are all evils due to a lack of knowledge? Are all interesting problems soluble? ALL the problems, really?!?! And what exactly is meant by interesting? Also, should “good guys” ignore the precautionary principle, and do they always win? What is the difference between cynicism, pessimism, and skepticism? And why is pessimism so attractive to so many humans?

Socials

• Follow us on Twitter at @IncrementsPod, @BennyChugg, @VadenMasrani
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Which unsolvable problem would you most like to solve? Send your answer via quantum tunneling to incrementspodcast@gmail.com

Special Guests: Bruce Nielson and Sam Kuypers.

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• Is hypnosis a real thing?
• Types of universality contained within the genetic code
• Pressures associated with turning political/philosophical ideas into personal identities
• How do emotions/feelings interface with our rational/logical mind? How should they?
• Vaden's (hopefully one-off) experience with Bipolar Type-1 and psychosis
• Is problem solving the sole purpose of thinking? Vaden says yes (with many caveats!) and Ben says wtf no you fool. Then we argue about how to watch TV.

Questions

1. (Neil Hudson) Are there any theories as to the type of universality achievable via the genetic code (in BOI it is presumed to fall short of coding for all possible life forms)?

2. (Neil Hudson) Wd be gd to get your take on: riffing on the Sperber/Mercier social thesis v. individual, if one is scarce private space/time then the need to constantly avow one’s public identity may “swamp” the critical evaluation of arguments one hears? Goes to seeking truth v status

3. (Arun Kannan) What are your thoughts on inexplicit knowledge (David Deutsch jargon) and more broadly emotions/feelings in the mind ? How do these interplay with explicit ideas / thoughts ? What should we prioritize ? If we don't prioritize one over the other, how to resolve conflicts between them ? Any tips, literature, Popperian wisdom you can share on this ?

4. (Tom Nassis) Is the sole purpose of all forms of thinking problem-solving? Or can thinking have purposes other than solving a problem?

Quotes

Reach always has an explanation. But this time, to the best of my knowledge, the explanation is not yet known. If the reason for the jump in reach was that it was a jump to universality, what was the universality? The genetic code is presumably not universal for specifying life forms, since it relies on specific types of chemicals, such as proteins. Could it be a universal constructor? Perhaps. It does manage to build with inorganic materials sometimes, such as the calcium phosphate in bones, or the magnetite in the navigation system inside a pigeon’s brain. Biotechnologists are already using it to manufacture hydrogen and to extract uranium from seawater. It can also program organisms to perform constructions outside their bodies: birds build nests; beavers build dams. Perhaps it would it be possible to specify, in the genetic code, an organism whose life cycle includes building a nuclear-powered spaceship. Or perhaps not. I guess it has some lesser, and not yet understood, universality.

In 1994 the computer scientist and molecular biologist Leonard Adleman designed and built a computer composed of DNA together with some simple enzymes, and demonstrated that it was capable of performing some sophisticated computations. At the time, Adleman’s DNA computer was arguably the fastest computer in the world. Further, it was clear that a universal classical computer could be made in a similar way. Hence we know that, whatever that other universality of the DNA system was, the universality of computation had also been inherent in it for billions of years, without ever being used – until Adleman used it.

Beginning of Infinity, p.158 (emph added)

References

• Derren brown makes people forget their stop
• Bari Weiss's conversation with Freddie deBoer on psychosis, bipolar, and mental health. This conversation addresses the New York Times article which views having schizophrenia, bipolar, etc as no better or worse than not having schizophrenia, bipolar, etc. Also contains Vaden's favorite euphemism of 2022: "Nonconsensus Realities"
• Sad existentialist cat

Send Vaden an email with a thought you have not designed to solve a problem at incrementspodcast.com

Socials

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We discuss

• Chapman's concept of nebulosity
• Whether this concept is covered by Popper
• The relationship of nebulosity and the vagueness of language
• The correspondence theory of truth
• If the concept of "problem situation" saves us from Chapman's critique
• Why "conjecture and criticism" isn't everything

References

• The excellent Do Explain podcast. Go listen, right now!
• In the cells of the eggplant, David Chapman
• Chapman's website
• Jake Orthwein on Do Explain, Part I

Chapman Quotes

Reasonableness is not interested in universality. It aims to get practical work done in specific situations. Precise definitions and absolute truths are rarely necessary or helpful for that. Is this thing an eggplant? Depends on what you are trying to do with it. Is there water in the refrigerator? Well, what do you want it for? What counts as baldness, fruit, red, or water depends on your purposes, and on all sorts of details of the situation. Those details are so numerous and various that they can’t all be taken into account ahead of time to make a general formal theory. Any factor might matter in some situation. On the other hand, nearly all are irrelevant in any specific situation, so determining whether the water in an eggplant counts, or if Alain is bald, is usually easy.

• David Chapman, When will you go bald?

Do cow hairs that have come out of the follicle but that are stuck to the cow by friction, sweat, or blood count as part of the cow? How about ones that are on the verge of falling out, but are stuck in the follicle by only the weakest of bonds? The reasonable answer is “Dude! It doesn’t matter!”

• David Chapman, Objects, objectively

We use words as tools to get things done; and to get things done, we improvise, making use of whatever materials are ready to hand. If you want to whack a piece of sheet metal to bend it, and don’t know or care what the “right” tool is (if there even is one), you might take a quick look around the garage, grab a large screwdriver at the “wrong” end, and hit the target with its hard rubber handle. A hand tool may have one or two standard uses; some less common but pretty obvious ones; and unusual, creative ones. But these are not clearly distinct categories of usage.

• David Chapman, The purpose of meaning

Popper Quotes

Observation is always selective. It needs a chosen object, a definite task, an interest, a point of view, a problem. And its description presupposes a descriptive language, with property words; it presupposes similarity and classification, which in their turn presuppose interests, points of view, and problems. ‘A hungry animal’, writes Katz, ‘divides the environment into edible and inedible things. An animal in flight sees roads to escape and hiding places . . . Generally speaking, objects change . . . according to the needs of the animal.’ We may add that objects can be classified, and can become similar or dissimilar, only in this way—by being related to needs and interests. This rule applies not only to animals but also to scientists. For the animal a point of view is provided by its needs, the task of the moment, and its expectations; for the scientist by his theoretical interests, the special problem under investigation, his conjectures and anticipations, and the theories which he accepts as a kind of background: his frame of reference, his "horizon of expectations".

• Conjectures and Refutations p. 61 (italics added)

I believe that there is a limited analogy between this situation and the way we ‘use our terms’ in science. The analogy can be described in this way. In a branch of mathematics in which we operate with signs defined by implicit definition, the fact that these signs have no ‘definite meaning’ does not affect our operating with them, or the precision of our theories. Why is that so? Because we do not overburden the signs. We do not attach a ‘meaning’ to them, beyond that shadow of a meaning that is warranted by our implicit definitions. (And if we attach to them an intuitive meaning, then we are careful to treat this as a private auxiliary device, which must not interfere with the theory.) In this way, we try to keep, as it were, within the ‘penumbra of vagueness’ or of ambiguity, and to avoid touching the problem of the precise limits of this penumbra or range; and it turns out that we can achieve a great deal without discussing the meaning of these signs; for nothing depends on their meaning. In a similar way, I believe, we can operate with these terms whose meaning wehave learned ‘operationally’. We use them, as it were, so that nothing depends upon their meaning, or as little as possible. Our ‘operational definitions’ have the advantage of helping us to shift the problem into a field in which nothing or little depends on words. Clear speaking is speaking in such a way that words do not matter.

• OSE p. 841 (italics in original)

Frege’s opinion is different; for he writes: “A definition of a concept ... must determine unambiguously of any object whether or not it falls under the concept . . . Using a metaphor, we may say: the concept must have a sharp boundary.” But it is clear that for this kind of absolute precision to be demanded of a defined concept, it must first be demanded of the defining concepts, and ultimately of our undefined, or primitive, terms. Yet this is impossible. For either our undefined or primitive terms have a traditional meaning (which is never very precise) or they are introduced by so-called “implicit definitions”—that is, through the way they are used in the context of a theory. This last way of introducing them—if they have to be “introduced”—seems to be the best. But it makes the meaning of the concepts depend on that of the theory, and most theories can be interpreted in more than one way. As a result, implicity defined concepts, and thus all concepts which are defined explicitly with their help, become not merely “vague” but systematically ambiguous. And the various systematically ambiguous interpretations (such as the points and straight lines of projective geometry) may be completely distinct.

• Unending Quest, p. 27 (italics added)

What I do suggest is that it is always undesirable to make an effort to increase precision for its own sake—especially linguistic precision—since this usually leads to loss of clarity, and to a waste of time and effort on preliminaries which often turn out to be useless, because they are bypassed by the real advance of the subject: one should never try to be more precise than the problem situation demands. ... One further result is, quite simply, the realization that the quest for precision, in words or concepts or meanings, is a wild-goose chase. There simply is no such thing as a precise concept (say, in Frege’s sense), though concepts like “price of this kettle” and “thirty pence” are usually precise enough for the problem context in which they are used.

• Unending Quest, p. 22 (italics in original)

Contact us

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How nebulous is your eggplant? Tell us at incrementspodcast@gmail.com.

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We discuss:

• Lulie's recent experience at EA Global
• Bayesianism and how it differs from critical rationalism
• Common arguments in favor of Bayesianism
• Taking Children Seriously
• What it was like for Lulie growing up without going to school
• The Alexander Technique, Internal Family Systems, Gendlin's Focusing, and Belief Reporting

References

• EA Global
• Taking Children Seriously
• Alexander Technique
• Internal Family Systems
• Gendlin Focusing

Social Media Everywhere
Follow Lulie on Twitter @reasonisfun. Follow us at @VadenMasrani, @BennyChugg, @IncrementsPod, or on Youtube.

Report your beliefs and focus your Gendlin's at incrementspodcast@gmail.com.

Special Guest: Lulie Tanett.

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• Wiki on scientific laws
• Hume's dialogues concerning natural religion  
• Proof of the impossibility of probability induction 
• One of the YouTube videos on induction. 

And in case you were wondering what happened to the two unfalsifiable theories Popper attacks in this chapter, you'll be pleased to know that they have merged into a super theory. We give you Psychoanalytic-Marxism: http://oldsite.english.ucsb.edu/faculty/janmohamed/Psychoanalytic-Marxism.pdf.

Sent us your favorite unfalsifiable theory at incrementspodcast@gmail.com

audio updated: 29/08/2021

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• Vaden's  Slides on a 1975 paper by Irving John Good titled Explicativity, Corroboration, and the Relative Odds of Hypotheses. The paper is I.J. Good’s response to Karl Popper, and in the presentation I compare the two philosophers’ views on probability, epistemology, induction, simplicity, and content.
• Diversity in Interpretations of Probability: Implications for Weather Forecasting
• Andrew Gelman, Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics
• Popper quote: "Those who identify confirmation with probability must believe that a high degree of probability is desirable. They implicitly accept the rule: ‘Always choose the most probable hypothesis!’ Now it can be easily shown that this rule is equivalent to the following rule: ‘Always choose the hypothesis which goes as little beyond the evidence as possible!’ And this, in turn, can be shown to be equivalent, not only to ‘Always accept the hypothesis with the lowest content (within the limits of your task, for example, your task of predicting)!’, but also to ‘Always choose the hypothesis which has the highest degree of ad hoc character (within the limits of your task)!’" (Conjectures and Refutations p.391) 

Get in touch at incrementspodcast@gmail.com.

audio updated 13/12/2020

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