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    <fireside:genDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 08:23:30 -0500</fireside:genDate>
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    <title>Increments - Episodes Tagged with “Conjectures And Refutations”</title>
    <link>https://www.incrementspodcast.com/tags/conjectures-and-refutations</link>
    <pubDate>Sat, 18 Apr 2026 17:00:00 -0700</pubDate>
    <description>Vaden Masrani, a senior research scientist in machine learning, and Ben Chugg, a PhD student in statistics, get into trouble arguing about everything except machine learning and statistics. Coherence is somewhere on the horizon. 
Bribes, suggestions, love-mail and hate-mail all welcome at incrementspodcast@gmail.com. 
</description>
    <language>en-us</language>
    <itunes:type>episodic</itunes:type>
    <itunes:subtitle>Science, Philosophy, Epistemology, Mayhem</itunes:subtitle>
    <itunes:author>Ben Chugg and Vaden Masrani</itunes:author>
    <itunes:summary>Vaden Masrani, a senior research scientist in machine learning, and Ben Chugg, a PhD student in statistics, get into trouble arguing about everything except machine learning and statistics. Coherence is somewhere on the horizon. 
Bribes, suggestions, love-mail and hate-mail all welcome at incrementspodcast@gmail.com. 
</itunes:summary>
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    <itunes:keywords>Philosophy,Science,Ethics,Progress,Knowledge,Computer Science,Conversation,Error-Correction</itunes:keywords>
    <itunes:owner>
      <itunes:name>Ben Chugg and Vaden Masrani</itunes:name>
      <itunes:email>incrementspodcast@gmail.com</itunes:email>
    </itunes:owner>
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  <itunes:category text="Philosophy"/>
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<item>
  <title>#101 (C&amp;R Chap 10, Part IV) - Was Popper Wrong about Verisimilitude?</title>
  <link>https://www.incrementspodcast.com/101</link>
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  <pubDate>Sat, 18 Apr 2026 17:00:00 -0700</pubDate>
  <author>Ben Chugg and Vaden Masrani</author>
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  <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
  <itunes:author>Ben Chugg and Vaden Masrani</itunes:author>
  <itunes:subtitle>Conjectures and refutations, Chapter 10, Part 4 baby. What's the deal with corroboration and verisimilitude?</itunes:subtitle>
  <itunes:duration>1:17:01</itunes:duration>
  <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
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  <description>&lt;p&gt;Wasn't Popper a falsificationist? Then why did he try to develop ideas about corroboration and versimilitude - the extent to which a theory was closer to truth than another theory? Isn't this verging dangerously close to verificationist territory? &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;In our fourth ep on Chapter 10 in C&amp;amp;R, we wrestle with Popper's treatment of verisimilutude, both the formal and informal versions. Did the project fail? Was Popper out of his mind? Does this invalidate everything?&lt;/p&gt;

We discuss

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Murders with ball-peen hammers &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Walking the line between verification and falsification&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Is science only after truth?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Verisimilutude and its formalization &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Why the formalization fails &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Popper's three requirements for the growth of knowledge&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Popper's ratchet and the no ad-hoc rule &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

Quotes

&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; Like many other philosophers I am at times inclined to classify philosophers as belonging to two main groups—those with whom I disagree, and those who agree with me.&lt;br&gt;
&amp;gt; - C&amp;amp;R, page 309 &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; I shall give here a somewhat unsystematic list of six types of cases in which we should be inclined to say of a theory t1 that it is superseded by t2 in the sense that t2 seems—as far as we know—to correspond better to the facts than t1 , in some sense or other.&lt;br&gt;
&amp;gt; -  t2 makes more precise assertions than t1 , and these more precise assertions stand up to more precise tests.&lt;br&gt;
&amp;gt; - t2 takes account of, and explains, more facts than t1 (which will include for example the above case that, other things being equal, t2 ’s assertions are more precise).&lt;br&gt;
&amp;gt; - t2 describes, or explains, the facts in more detail than t1 .&lt;br&gt;
&amp;gt; - t2 has passed tests which t 1 has failed to pass.&lt;br&gt;
&amp;gt; - t2 has suggested new experimental tests, not considered before t 2 was designed (and not suggested by t1 , and perhaps not even applicable to t1 ); and t 2 has passed these tests.&lt;br&gt;
&amp;gt; - t2 has uniﬁed or connected various hitherto unrelated problems.&lt;br&gt;
&amp;gt; &lt;br&gt;
&amp;gt; - C&amp;amp;R, page 315&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; Let me ﬁrst say that I do not suggest that the explicit introduction of the idea of verisimilitude will lead to any changes in the theory of method. On the contrary, I think that my theory of testability or corroboration by empirical tests is the proper methodological counterpart to this new metalogical idea. The only improvement is one of clariﬁcation.&lt;br&gt;
&amp;gt; - C&amp;amp;R, page 318&lt;/p&gt;

Socials

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Follow us on Twitter at @IncrementsPod, @BennyChugg, @VadenMasrani&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Come join our discord server! DM us on twitter or send us an email to get a supersecret link&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Become a patreon subscriber &lt;a href="https://www.patreon.com/Increments" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener"&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;. Or give us one-time cash donations to help cover our lack of cash donations &lt;a href="https://ko-fi.com/increments" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener"&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Click dem like buttons on &lt;a href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC_4wZzQyoW4s4ZuE4FY9DQQ" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener"&gt;youtube&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;How many chromosomes does diethyl-methyl pentophosphate have, exactly? Tell as at &lt;a href="mailto:incrementspodcast@gmail.com" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener"&gt;incrementspodcast@gmail.com&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
  <itunes:keywords>popper, verisimilitude, falsification, verificationism, conjectures-and-refutations, epistemology</itunes:keywords>
  <content:encoded>
    <![CDATA[<p>Wasn&#39;t Popper a falsificationist? Then why did he try to develop ideas about corroboration and versimilitude - the extent to which a theory was closer to truth than another theory? Isn&#39;t this verging dangerously close to verificationist territory? </p>

<p>In our fourth ep on Chapter 10 in C&amp;R, we wrestle with Popper&#39;s treatment of verisimilutude, both the formal and informal versions. Did the project fail? Was Popper out of his mind? Does this invalidate everything?</p>

<h1>We discuss</h1>

<ul>
<li>Murders with ball-peen hammers </li>
<li>Walking the line between verification and falsification</li>
<li>Is science only after truth?</li>
<li>Verisimilutude and its formalization </li>
<li>Why the formalization fails </li>
<li>Popper&#39;s three requirements for the growth of knowledge</li>
<li>Popper&#39;s ratchet and the no ad-hoc rule </li>
</ul>

<h1>Quotes</h1>

<blockquote>
<p>Like many other philosophers I am at times inclined to classify philosophers as belonging to two main groups—those with whom I disagree, and those who agree with me.<br>
- C&amp;R, page 309 </p>

<p>I shall give here a somewhat unsystematic list of six types of cases in which we should be inclined to say of a theory t1 that it is superseded by t2 in the sense that t2 seems—as far as we know—to correspond better to the facts than t1 , in some sense or other.</p>

<ul>
<li> t2 makes more precise assertions than t1 , and these more precise assertions stand up to more precise tests.</li>
<li>t2 takes account of, and explains, more facts than t1 (which will include for example the above case that, other things being equal, t2 ’s assertions are more precise).</li>
<li>t2 describes, or explains, the facts in more detail than t1 .</li>
<li>t2 has passed tests which t 1 has failed to pass.</li>
<li>t2 has suggested new experimental tests, not considered before t 2 was designed (and not suggested by t1 , and perhaps not even applicable to t1 ); and t 2 has passed these tests.</li>
<li>t2 has uniﬁed or connected various hitherto unrelated problems.</li>
</ul>

<p>- C&amp;R, page 315</p>

<p>Let me ﬁrst say that I do not suggest that the explicit introduction of the idea of verisimilitude will lead to any changes in the theory of method. On the contrary, I think that my theory of testability or corroboration by empirical tests is the proper methodological counterpart to this new metalogical idea. The only improvement is one of clariﬁcation.<br>
- C&amp;R, page 318</p>
</blockquote>

<h1>Socials</h1>

<ul>
<li>Follow us on Twitter at @IncrementsPod, @BennyChugg, @VadenMasrani</li>
<li>Come join our discord server! DM us on twitter or send us an email to get a supersecret link</li>
<li>Become a patreon subscriber <a href="https://www.patreon.com/Increments" rel="nofollow">here</a>. Or give us one-time cash donations to help cover our lack of cash donations <a href="https://ko-fi.com/increments" rel="nofollow">here</a>.</li>
<li>Click dem like buttons on <a href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC_4wZzQyoW4s4ZuE4FY9DQQ" rel="nofollow">youtube</a></li>
</ul>

<p>How many chromosomes does diethyl-methyl pentophosphate have, exactly? Tell as at <a href="mailto:incrementspodcast@gmail.com" rel="nofollow">incrementspodcast@gmail.com</a></p><p><a rel="payment" href="https://www.patreon.com/Increments">Support Increments</a></p>]]>
  </content:encoded>
  <itunes:summary>
    <![CDATA[<p>Wasn&#39;t Popper a falsificationist? Then why did he try to develop ideas about corroboration and versimilitude - the extent to which a theory was closer to truth than another theory? Isn&#39;t this verging dangerously close to verificationist territory? </p>

<p>In our fourth ep on Chapter 10 in C&amp;R, we wrestle with Popper&#39;s treatment of verisimilutude, both the formal and informal versions. Did the project fail? Was Popper out of his mind? Does this invalidate everything?</p>

<h1>We discuss</h1>

<ul>
<li>Murders with ball-peen hammers </li>
<li>Walking the line between verification and falsification</li>
<li>Is science only after truth?</li>
<li>Verisimilutude and its formalization </li>
<li>Why the formalization fails </li>
<li>Popper&#39;s three requirements for the growth of knowledge</li>
<li>Popper&#39;s ratchet and the no ad-hoc rule </li>
</ul>

<h1>Quotes</h1>

<blockquote>
<p>Like many other philosophers I am at times inclined to classify philosophers as belonging to two main groups—those with whom I disagree, and those who agree with me.<br>
- C&amp;R, page 309 </p>

<p>I shall give here a somewhat unsystematic list of six types of cases in which we should be inclined to say of a theory t1 that it is superseded by t2 in the sense that t2 seems—as far as we know—to correspond better to the facts than t1 , in some sense or other.</p>

<ul>
<li> t2 makes more precise assertions than t1 , and these more precise assertions stand up to more precise tests.</li>
<li>t2 takes account of, and explains, more facts than t1 (which will include for example the above case that, other things being equal, t2 ’s assertions are more precise).</li>
<li>t2 describes, or explains, the facts in more detail than t1 .</li>
<li>t2 has passed tests which t 1 has failed to pass.</li>
<li>t2 has suggested new experimental tests, not considered before t 2 was designed (and not suggested by t1 , and perhaps not even applicable to t1 ); and t 2 has passed these tests.</li>
<li>t2 has uniﬁed or connected various hitherto unrelated problems.</li>
</ul>

<p>- C&amp;R, page 315</p>

<p>Let me ﬁrst say that I do not suggest that the explicit introduction of the idea of verisimilitude will lead to any changes in the theory of method. On the contrary, I think that my theory of testability or corroboration by empirical tests is the proper methodological counterpart to this new metalogical idea. The only improvement is one of clariﬁcation.<br>
- C&amp;R, page 318</p>
</blockquote>

<h1>Socials</h1>

<ul>
<li>Follow us on Twitter at @IncrementsPod, @BennyChugg, @VadenMasrani</li>
<li>Come join our discord server! DM us on twitter or send us an email to get a supersecret link</li>
<li>Become a patreon subscriber <a href="https://www.patreon.com/Increments" rel="nofollow">here</a>. Or give us one-time cash donations to help cover our lack of cash donations <a href="https://ko-fi.com/increments" rel="nofollow">here</a>.</li>
<li>Click dem like buttons on <a href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC_4wZzQyoW4s4ZuE4FY9DQQ" rel="nofollow">youtube</a></li>
</ul>

<p>How many chromosomes does diethyl-methyl pentophosphate have, exactly? Tell as at <a href="mailto:incrementspodcast@gmail.com" rel="nofollow">incrementspodcast@gmail.com</a></p><p><a rel="payment" href="https://www.patreon.com/Increments">Support Increments</a></p>]]>
  </itunes:summary>
</item>
<item>
  <title>#59 (C&amp;R, Chap 8) - On the Status of Science and Metaphysics (Plus reflections on the Brett Hall blog exchange) </title>
  <link>https://www.incrementspodcast.com/59</link>
  <guid isPermaLink="false">6363ebbf-c232-45f7-adbc-140ab1f61037</guid>
  <pubDate>Fri, 22 Dec 2023 12:00:00 -0800</pubDate>
  <author>Ben Chugg and Vaden Masrani</author>
  <enclosure url="https://dts.podtrac.com/redirect.mp3/https://chrt.fm/track/1F5B4D/aphid.fireside.fm/d/1437767933/3229e340-4bf1-42a5-a5b7-4f508a27131c/6363ebbf-c232-45f7-adbc-140ab1f61037.mp3" length="82956119" type="audio/mpeg"/>
  <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
  <itunes:author>Ben Chugg and Vaden Masrani</itunes:author>
  <itunes:subtitle>Chapter 8 of conjectures and refutations! Back on the horse baby, talkin' bout Kant, induction, irrefutability, induction - all the good stuff. Oh, and also Vaden's failed blog exchange w/ Brett Hall</itunes:subtitle>
  <itunes:duration>1:26:24</itunes:duration>
  <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
  <itunes:image href="https://media24.fireside.fm/file/fireside-images-2024/podcasts/images/3/3229e340-4bf1-42a5-a5b7-4f508a27131c/episodes/6/6363ebbf-c232-45f7-adbc-140ab1f61037/cover.jpg?v=1"/>
  <description>&lt;p&gt;Back to the C&amp;amp;R series baby! Feels goooooood. Need some bar-room explanations for why induction is impossible? We gotchu. Need some historical background on where your boy Isaac got his ideas? We gotchu. Need to know how to refute the irrefutable? Gotchu there too homie, because today we're diving into Conjectures and Refutations, Chapter 8: On the Status of Science and Metaphysics. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Oh, and we also discuss, in admittedly frustrated tones, the failed blog exchange between Brett Hall and Vaden on prediction and Austrianism. If you want the full listening experience, we suggest reading both posts before hearing our kvetching:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;a href="https://vmasrani.github.io/blog/2023/predicting-human-behaviour/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener"&gt;Vaden's post&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;a href="https://www.bretthall.org/blog/humans-are-creative" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener"&gt;Brett's "response"&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Hold on to your hats for this one listeners, because she starts off rather spicy. &lt;/p&gt;

We discuss

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Why Kant believed in the truth of Newtonian mechanics &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Newton and his assertion that he arrived at his theory via induction &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Why this isn't true and is logically impossible&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Was Copernicus influenced by Platonic ideals?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;How Kepler came up with the idea of elliptical orbits &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Why finite observations are always compatible with infinitely many theories &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Kant's paradox and his solution &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Popper's updated solution to Kant's paradox &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The irrefutability of philosophical theories &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;How can we say that irrefutable theories are false?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Annnnnd perhaps a few cheap shots here and there about Austrian Economics as well. 
# References &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Some &lt;a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/copernicus/notes.html#note-6" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener"&gt;background history&lt;/a&gt; on Copernicus and why Ben thinks Popper is wrong &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

Quotes

&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; Listening to this statement you may well wonder how I can possibly hold a theory to be false and irrefutable at one and the same time—I who claim to be a rationalist. For how can a rationalist say of a theory that it is false and irrefutable? Is he not bound, as a rationalist, to refute a theory before he asserts that it is false? And conversely, is he not bound to admit that if a theory is irrefutable, it is true?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; Now if we look upon a theory as a proposed solution to a set of problems, then the theory immediately lends itself to critical discussion—even if it is non-empirical and irrefutable. For we can now ask questions such as, Does it solve the problem? Does it solve it better than other theories? Has it perhaps merely shifted the problem? Is the solution simple? Is it fruitful? Does it perhaps contradict other philosophical theories needed for solving other problems?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; Because, as you [Kant] said, we are not passive receptors of sense data, but active organisms. Because we react to our environment not always merely instinctively, but sometimes con- sciously and freely. Because we can invent myths, stories, theories; because we have a thirst for explanation, an insatiable curiosity, a wish to know. Because we not only invent stories and theories, but try them out and see whether they work and how they work. Because by a great effort, by trying hard and making many mistakes, we may sometimes, if we are lucky, succeed in hitting upon a story, an explanation, which ‘saves the phenomena’; perhaps by making up a myth about ‘invisibles’, such as atoms or gravitational forces, which explain the visible. Because knowledge is an adventure of ideas. These ideas, it is true, are produced by us, and not by the world around us; they are not merely the traces of repeated sensations or stimuli or what not; here you were right. But we are more active and free than even you believed; for similar observations or similar environmental situations do not, as your theory implied, produce similar explanations in different men. Nor is the fact that we create our theories, and that we attempt to impose them upon the world, an explanation of their success, as you believed. For the overwhelming majority of our theories, of our freely invented ideas, are unsuccessful; they do not stand up to searching tests, and are discarded as falsified by experience. Only a very few of them succeed, for a time, in the competitive struggle for survival.&lt;br&gt;
&amp;gt; \ &lt;br&gt;
&amp;gt; C&amp;amp;R Chapter 2&lt;/p&gt;

Socials

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Follow us on Twitter at @IncrementsPod, @BennyChugg, @VadenMasrani&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Come join our discord server! DM us on twitter or send us an email to get a supersecret link&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Help us fund more hour-long blog posts and get exclusive bonus content by becoming a patreon subscriber &lt;a href="https://www.patreon.com/Increments" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener"&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;. Or give us one-time cash donations to help cover anger management &lt;a href="https://ko-fi.com/increments" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener"&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Click dem like buttons on &lt;a href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC_4wZzQyoW4s4ZuE4FY9DQQ" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener"&gt;youtube&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Would you rather be wrong or boring? Tell us at &lt;a href="mailto:incrementspodcast@gmail.com" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener"&gt;incrementspodcast@gmail.com&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
</description>
  <itunes:keywords>conjectures-and-refutations, induction, Kant, metaphysics, irrefutability, Copernicus, austrianism, prediction</itunes:keywords>
  <content:encoded>
    <![CDATA[<p>Back to the C&amp;R series baby! Feels goooooood. Need some bar-room explanations for why induction is impossible? We gotchu. Need some historical background on where your boy Isaac got his ideas? We gotchu. Need to know how to refute the irrefutable? Gotchu there too homie, because today we&#39;re diving into Conjectures and Refutations, Chapter 8: On the Status of Science and Metaphysics. </p>

<p>Oh, and we also discuss, in admittedly frustrated tones, the failed blog exchange between Brett Hall and Vaden on prediction and Austrianism. If you want the full listening experience, we suggest reading both posts before hearing our kvetching:</p>

<ul>
<li><a href="https://vmasrani.github.io/blog/2023/predicting-human-behaviour/" rel="nofollow">Vaden&#39;s post</a> </li>
<li><a href="https://www.bretthall.org/blog/humans-are-creative" rel="nofollow">Brett&#39;s &quot;response&quot;</a> </li>
</ul>

<p>Hold on to your hats for this one listeners, because she starts off rather spicy. </p>

<h1>We discuss</h1>

<ul>
<li>Why Kant believed in the truth of Newtonian mechanics </li>
<li>Newton and his assertion that he arrived at his theory via induction </li>
<li>Why this isn&#39;t true and is logically impossible</li>
<li>Was Copernicus influenced by Platonic ideals?</li>
<li>How Kepler came up with the idea of elliptical orbits </li>
<li>Why finite observations are always compatible with infinitely many theories </li>
<li>Kant&#39;s paradox and his solution </li>
<li>Popper&#39;s updated solution to Kant&#39;s paradox </li>
<li>The irrefutability of philosophical theories </li>
<li>How can we say that irrefutable theories are false?</li>
<li>Annnnnd perhaps a few cheap shots here and there about Austrian Economics as well. 
# References </li>
<li>Some <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/copernicus/notes.html#note-6" rel="nofollow">background history</a> on Copernicus and why Ben thinks Popper is wrong </li>
</ul>

<h1>Quotes</h1>

<blockquote>
<p>Listening to this statement you may well wonder how I can possibly hold a theory to be false and irrefutable at one and the same time—I who claim to be a rationalist. For how can a rationalist say of a theory that it is false and irrefutable? Is he not bound, as a rationalist, to refute a theory before he asserts that it is false? And conversely, is he not bound to admit that if a theory is irrefutable, it is true?</p>

<p>Now if we look upon a theory as a proposed solution to a set of problems, then the theory immediately lends itself to critical discussion—even if it is non-empirical and irrefutable. For we can now ask questions such as, Does it solve the problem? Does it solve it better than other theories? Has it perhaps merely shifted the problem? Is the solution simple? Is it fruitful? Does it perhaps contradict other philosophical theories needed for solving other problems?</p>

<p>Because, as you [Kant] said, we are not passive receptors of sense data, but active organisms. Because we react to our environment not always merely instinctively, but sometimes con- sciously and freely. Because we can invent myths, stories, theories; because we have a thirst for explanation, an insatiable curiosity, a wish to know. Because we not only invent stories and theories, but try them out and see whether they work and how they work. Because by a great effort, by trying hard and making many mistakes, we may sometimes, if we are lucky, succeed in hitting upon a story, an explanation, which ‘saves the phenomena’; perhaps by making up a myth about ‘invisibles’, such as atoms or gravitational forces, which explain the visible. Because knowledge is an adventure of ideas. These ideas, it is true, are produced by us, and not by the world around us; they are not merely the traces of repeated sensations or stimuli or what not; here you were right. But we are more active and free than even you believed; for similar observations or similar environmental situations do not, as your theory implied, produce similar explanations in different men. Nor is the fact that we create our theories, and that we attempt to impose them upon the world, an explanation of their success, as you believed. For the overwhelming majority of our theories, of our freely invented ideas, are unsuccessful; they do not stand up to searching tests, and are discarded as falsified by experience. Only a very few of them succeed, for a time, in the competitive struggle for survival.<br>
\ <br>
C&amp;R Chapter 2</p>

<h1>Socials</h1>
</blockquote>

<ul>
<li>Follow us on Twitter at @IncrementsPod, @BennyChugg, @VadenMasrani</li>
<li>Come join our discord server! DM us on twitter or send us an email to get a supersecret link</li>
<li>Help us fund more hour-long blog posts and get exclusive bonus content by becoming a patreon subscriber <a href="https://www.patreon.com/Increments" rel="nofollow">here</a>. Or give us one-time cash donations to help cover anger management <a href="https://ko-fi.com/increments" rel="nofollow">here</a>.</li>
<li>Click dem like buttons on <a href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC_4wZzQyoW4s4ZuE4FY9DQQ" rel="nofollow">youtube</a></li>
</ul>

<p>Would you rather be wrong or boring? Tell us at <a href="mailto:incrementspodcast@gmail.com" rel="nofollow">incrementspodcast@gmail.com</a></p><p><a rel="payment" href="https://www.patreon.com/Increments">Support Increments</a></p>]]>
  </content:encoded>
  <itunes:summary>
    <![CDATA[<p>Back to the C&amp;R series baby! Feels goooooood. Need some bar-room explanations for why induction is impossible? We gotchu. Need some historical background on where your boy Isaac got his ideas? We gotchu. Need to know how to refute the irrefutable? Gotchu there too homie, because today we&#39;re diving into Conjectures and Refutations, Chapter 8: On the Status of Science and Metaphysics. </p>

<p>Oh, and we also discuss, in admittedly frustrated tones, the failed blog exchange between Brett Hall and Vaden on prediction and Austrianism. If you want the full listening experience, we suggest reading both posts before hearing our kvetching:</p>

<ul>
<li><a href="https://vmasrani.github.io/blog/2023/predicting-human-behaviour/" rel="nofollow">Vaden&#39;s post</a> </li>
<li><a href="https://www.bretthall.org/blog/humans-are-creative" rel="nofollow">Brett&#39;s &quot;response&quot;</a> </li>
</ul>

<p>Hold on to your hats for this one listeners, because she starts off rather spicy. </p>

<h1>We discuss</h1>

<ul>
<li>Why Kant believed in the truth of Newtonian mechanics </li>
<li>Newton and his assertion that he arrived at his theory via induction </li>
<li>Why this isn&#39;t true and is logically impossible</li>
<li>Was Copernicus influenced by Platonic ideals?</li>
<li>How Kepler came up with the idea of elliptical orbits </li>
<li>Why finite observations are always compatible with infinitely many theories </li>
<li>Kant&#39;s paradox and his solution </li>
<li>Popper&#39;s updated solution to Kant&#39;s paradox </li>
<li>The irrefutability of philosophical theories </li>
<li>How can we say that irrefutable theories are false?</li>
<li>Annnnnd perhaps a few cheap shots here and there about Austrian Economics as well. 
# References </li>
<li>Some <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/copernicus/notes.html#note-6" rel="nofollow">background history</a> on Copernicus and why Ben thinks Popper is wrong </li>
</ul>

<h1>Quotes</h1>

<blockquote>
<p>Listening to this statement you may well wonder how I can possibly hold a theory to be false and irrefutable at one and the same time—I who claim to be a rationalist. For how can a rationalist say of a theory that it is false and irrefutable? Is he not bound, as a rationalist, to refute a theory before he asserts that it is false? And conversely, is he not bound to admit that if a theory is irrefutable, it is true?</p>

<p>Now if we look upon a theory as a proposed solution to a set of problems, then the theory immediately lends itself to critical discussion—even if it is non-empirical and irrefutable. For we can now ask questions such as, Does it solve the problem? Does it solve it better than other theories? Has it perhaps merely shifted the problem? Is the solution simple? Is it fruitful? Does it perhaps contradict other philosophical theories needed for solving other problems?</p>

<p>Because, as you [Kant] said, we are not passive receptors of sense data, but active organisms. Because we react to our environment not always merely instinctively, but sometimes con- sciously and freely. Because we can invent myths, stories, theories; because we have a thirst for explanation, an insatiable curiosity, a wish to know. Because we not only invent stories and theories, but try them out and see whether they work and how they work. Because by a great effort, by trying hard and making many mistakes, we may sometimes, if we are lucky, succeed in hitting upon a story, an explanation, which ‘saves the phenomena’; perhaps by making up a myth about ‘invisibles’, such as atoms or gravitational forces, which explain the visible. Because knowledge is an adventure of ideas. These ideas, it is true, are produced by us, and not by the world around us; they are not merely the traces of repeated sensations or stimuli or what not; here you were right. But we are more active and free than even you believed; for similar observations or similar environmental situations do not, as your theory implied, produce similar explanations in different men. Nor is the fact that we create our theories, and that we attempt to impose them upon the world, an explanation of their success, as you believed. For the overwhelming majority of our theories, of our freely invented ideas, are unsuccessful; they do not stand up to searching tests, and are discarded as falsified by experience. Only a very few of them succeed, for a time, in the competitive struggle for survival.<br>
\ <br>
C&amp;R Chapter 2</p>

<h1>Socials</h1>
</blockquote>

<ul>
<li>Follow us on Twitter at @IncrementsPod, @BennyChugg, @VadenMasrani</li>
<li>Come join our discord server! DM us on twitter or send us an email to get a supersecret link</li>
<li>Help us fund more hour-long blog posts and get exclusive bonus content by becoming a patreon subscriber <a href="https://www.patreon.com/Increments" rel="nofollow">here</a>. Or give us one-time cash donations to help cover anger management <a href="https://ko-fi.com/increments" rel="nofollow">here</a>.</li>
<li>Click dem like buttons on <a href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC_4wZzQyoW4s4ZuE4FY9DQQ" rel="nofollow">youtube</a></li>
</ul>

<p>Would you rather be wrong or boring? Tell us at <a href="mailto:incrementspodcast@gmail.com" rel="nofollow">incrementspodcast@gmail.com</a></p><p><a rel="payment" href="https://www.patreon.com/Increments">Support Increments</a></p>]]>
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